**ANONYMOUS**
**PAGE 1 OF 1**

I'm just calling to comment on this transfer of plutonium to Canada and your policies in general. I approve 100 percent. I think you're doing a great thing and I figured a lot of people are going to be calling and bitching so you might want to hear something favorable. Keep it up. Thank you. 1

PD041

**PD041–1** **DOE Policy**

DOE acknowledges the commentor's support for DOE policy and the surplus plutonium disposition program. In the SPD Draft EIS, DOE retained the option to use some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in CANDU reactors, which would have only been undertaken in the event that a multilateral agreement were negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the United States. Since the Draft was issued, DOE determined that adequate reactor capacity is available in the United States to disposition the portion of the U.S. surplus plutonium that is suitable for MOX fuel and, therefore, while still reserving the CANDU option, DOE is no longer actively pursuing it. However, DOE, in cooperation with Canada and Russia, proposes to participate in a test and demonstration program using U.S. and Russian MOX fuel in a Canadian test reactor. A separate environmental review, the *Environmental Assessment for the Parallex Project Fuel Manufacture and Shipment* (DOE/EA-1216, January 1999), analyzes the fabrication and proposed shipment of MOX fuel rods for research and development activities involving the use of limited amounts of U.S. MOX fuel in a Canadian test reactor. A FONSI was signed on August 13, 1999. Both of these documents can be viewed on the MD Web site at http://www.doe-md.com. If a decision is made to dispose of Russian surplus plutonium in Canadian CANDU reactors in order to augment Russian's disposition capability, shipments of the Russian MOX fuel would take place directly between Russia and Canada.

**ANONYMOUS**
**PAGE 1 OF 1**

Yes, I'm calling to make a comment about the DOE using MOX plutonium fuel in the nuclear reactors that we have already. I am totally opposed to this 100 percent. I don't want to even, I don't want anything that has to do with radioactivity. And I don't think it's good for the earth. I think that, that burning bomb material, nuclear bomb material is a big mistake for existing reactors. I think the public is against building new reactors for such a thing. I think burning radioactive materials is a very scary thing to begin with. I'm opposed to traveling it through, by rail or highway. Gosh I could go on forever. So, thank you for listening and I do urge that the government just stay away from this. It is very scary. Thank you. 1

PD045

**PD045–1** **MOX Approach**

DOE acknowledges the commentor's opposition to the MOX approach. The goal of the surplus plutonium disposition program is to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting disposition of surplus plutonium in the United States in an environmentally safe and timely manner. Converting the surplus plutonium into MOX fuel and using it in domestic, commercial reactors is an effective way to accomplish this. Consistent with the U.S. policy of discouraging the civilian use of plutonium, a MOX facility would be built and operated subject to the following strict conditions: construction would take place at a secure DOE site, it would be owned by the U.S. Government, operations would be limited exclusively to the disposition of surplus plutonium, and the MOX facility would be shut down at the completion of the surplus plutonium disposition program. For reactor irradiation, the NRC license would authorize only the participating reactors to use MOX fuel fabricated from surplus plutonium, and the irradiation would be a once-through cycle with no reprocessing. Section 4.28 was revised to discuss the potential environmental impacts of operating Catawba, McGuire, and North Anna, the reactors that would use the MOX fuel, should the decision be made to proceed with the hybrid approach.

The transportation requirements for the surplus plutonium disposition program are also evaluated in this SPD EIS. Transportation would be required for both the immobilization and MOX approaches to surplus plutonium disposition. Transportation of special nuclear materials, including fresh MOX fuel, would use DOE's SST/SGT system. Since the establishment of the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division in 1975, the SST/SGT system has transported DOE-owned cargo over more than 151 million km (94 million mi) with no accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive material.

**ANONYMOUS**
**PAGE 1 OF 1**

Yes, I've recently learned that the plan or the plan that's being formulated to dispose of plutonium by having commercial utilities use it as mixed oxide fuel. And as a person who works in the electric utility field I want to express an extreme concern about this very dangerous practice. Not only are commercial , commercial utilities likely to not manage the plutonium safely, some will but many won't, but the risk of an accident or even worse a high-jacking of trucks carrying plutonium around the country is just totally unacceptable. And this my comment is a very strong argument that this is a bad choice. That vitrification of plutonium is probably the only safe way to handle it. Thank you. 1

PD051

**PD051–1** **Alternatives**

DOE acknowledges the commentor's opposition to the MOX approach. DOE has identified as its preferred alternative the hybrid approach. Pursuing both immobilization and MOX fuel fabrication provides the United States important insurance against potential disadvantages of implementing either approach by itself. The hybrid approach also provides the best opportunity for U.S. leadership in working with Russia to implement similar options for reducing Russia's excess plutonium in parallel. Further, it sends the strongest possible signal to the world of U.S. determination to reduce stockpiles of surplus plutonium as quickly as possible and in a manner that would make it technically difficult to use the plutonium in nuclear weapons again.

Transportation would be required for both the immobilization and MOX approaches to surplus plutonium disposition. Transportation of special nuclear materials, including fresh MOX fuel, would use DOE's SST/SGT system. Since the establishment of the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division in 1975, the SST/SGT system has transported DOE-owned cargo over more than 151 million km (94 million mi) with no accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive material. Section 4.30.1.6 and Appendix L address the impacts of transportation, and Appendix K, the impacts of accidents. The analyses indicate that the impacts from the hybrid approach would likely be minor. Decisions on the surplus plutonium disposition program will be based on environmental analyses, technical and cost reports, national policy and nonproliferation considerations, and public input.

**ANONYMOUS**
**PAGE 1 OF 1**

Hello, I definitely want to say no to the mixed oxide fuel containing plutonium or MOX. It's not to be used in commercial reactors because of the transportation and safety problems. As plutonium fuel is hazardous process and it adds more to the radioactive waste to be disposed of which we haven't done to good a job of yet. Weapons grade plutonium has been in the hands of the military. Changing the U.S. policy to put it in the hands of commercial businesses all over the country, it's a highly, and it changes our policy to put it in the hands of commercial businesses. Highly carcinogenic and extreme threat to life support systems. So it should be immobilized with vitrification in ceramic or glass surroundings. Thank you. Bye

1

PD054

**PD054–1** **Alternatives**

DOE acknowledges the commentor's opposition to the MOX approach. DOE has identified as its preferred alternative the hybrid approach. Pursuing both immobilization and MOX fuel fabrication provides the United States important insurance against potential disadvantages of implementing either approach by itself. The hybrid approach also provides the best opportunity for U.S. leadership in working with Russia to implement similar options for reducing Russia's excess plutonium in parallel. Further, it sends the strongest possible signal to the world of U.S. determination to reduce stockpiles of surplus plutonium as quickly as possible and in a manner that would make it technically difficult to use the plutonium in nuclear weapons again.

Transportation would be required for both the immobilization and MOX approaches to surplus plutonium disposition. Transportation of special nuclear materials, including fresh MOX fuel, would use DOE's SST/SGT system. Since the establishment of the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division in 1975, the SST/SGT system has transported DOE-owned cargo over more than 151 million km (94 million mi) with no accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive material. Section 4.30.1.6 and Appendix L address the impacts of transportation, and Appendix K, the impacts of accidents. The analyses indicate that the impacts from the hybrid approach would likely be minor.

Consistent with the U.S. policy of discouraging the civilian use of plutonium, a MOX facility would be built and operated subject to the following strict conditions: construction would take place at a secure DOE site, it would be owned by the U.S. Government, operations would be limited exclusively to the disposition of surplus plutonium, and the MOX facility would be shut down at the completion of the surplus plutonium disposition program.

As described in Sections 2.18.3 and 4.28.2.8, additional spent fuel would be produced by using MOX fuel instead of LEU fuel in domestic, commercial reactors. Spent fuel management at the proposed reactor sites is not expected to change dramatically due to the substitution of MOX assemblies for some of the LEU assemblies. Likewise, the additional spent fuel would be a very small fraction of the total that would be managed at the potential geologic repository. Decisions on the surplus plutonium disposition program will be based on environmental analyses, technical and cost reports, national policy and nonproliferation considerations, and public input.

**MALESK, JIM**
**PAGE 1 OF 1**

Yes, my name is Jim Malesk. I want to express my deep concern over the use of plutonium that is being suggested. I think that plutonium is the most dangerous of element in the world. The size of a grain of sand can cause instant cancer that confines itself in the lungs. Using it to, as part of a burning off process, I am totally against. I think it is environmentally insanity and I want to register my complaint. Thank you. 1

PD005

**PD005–1** **MOX Approach**

DOE acknowledges the commentor's opposition to the MOX approach. The goal of the surplus plutonium disposition program is to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting disposition of surplus plutonium in the United States in an environmentally safe and timely manner. Converting the surplus plutonium into MOX fuel and using it in domestic, commercial reactors is an effective way to accomplish this. Consistent with the U.S. policy of discouraging the civilian use of plutonium, a MOX facility would be built and operated subject to the following strict conditions: construction would take place at a secure DOE site, it would be owned by the U.S. Government, operations would be limited exclusively to the disposition of surplus plutonium, and the MOX facility would be shut down at the completion of the surplus plutonium disposition program. The analysis conducted for this SPD EIS indicate potential environmental and human health impacts would likely be minor as discussed in Chapter 4 of Volume I.